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This paper presents a model of wage-employment determination in private and public sectors, 
which allows us to analyze the effects of different institutional arrangements on labor market 
equilibria. In particular, it focuses on how different degrees of coordination in decision 
processes affect hiring and wage setting outcomes. Cooperation in unions’ behavior results in 
wage increases and employment reduction in the private sector, whereas it induces wage 
moderation and employment expansion in the public sector. Not surprisingly, if public 
decision units do not fully internalize the aggregate budget constraint in their hiring processes, 
the public sector wage bill and the level of taxation increase, thus enhancing the crowding out 
effect on private employment. Such effect appears to be stronger in the presence of 
encompassing union behavior. An empirical analysis performed on a sample of OECD 
countries in the period 1960-2000 seems to support the main predictions of the model. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper builds on a set of stylized facts to set up a model of wage-employment determination in
private and public sectors, which allows to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent institutional arrangements
on the labor market equilibrium. In particular, it focuses on how diﬀerent degrees of coordination
in governments’ and unions’ decision processes aﬀect hiring and wage setting outcomes. The degree
of coordination inﬂuences governments’ and unions’ behavior in at least two ways: ﬁrst, decisional
units (at the central or local government level) negotiating about employment and wages in the
public sector may not internalize the nationwide budget constraint; second, the degree of coordina-
tion in wage negotiations may inﬂuence the extent of cooperation between the public sector unions
and the ones representing employees in the private sector. We believe that these issues are very
relevant at a time in which several European countries are delegating more powers to regional and
local authorities while at the same time the traditional wage negotiating rules are under discussion
or being revised.
Our main focus is on public employment. However, employment levels and earnings in the
public sector are related to the private sector ones in several ways. In the ﬁrst place, resources to
pay wages to public employees are drawn from the private sector and to a large extent from private
sector labor earnings. Therefore, a growing private sector economy should allow for higher wages
and employment levels also in the public sector. Secondly, in their hiring processes governments
may take into account not only the needs related to public production but also considerations about
the developments of the overall labor market, as the level of the unemployment rate or its variability
over time. A third important reason regards wage setting: public sector unions may coordinate
their activity and cooperate with private sector unions; in countries with a very centralized wage
negotiation process, usually the same unions negotiate for both public and private sector wages.
Wage and employment characteristics in the public sector diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those in the
private sector. Table 1A in the appendix shows that the number of public employees, both as a share
of total employed and as a share of dependent employees, has been growing signiﬁcantly between
1960 and the end of 1980s in the major European countries; in the last decade, with the exception
of France, these countries have kept constant or reduced the share of public employment.1 These
developments can be traced back to the expansion of the welfare state and of the local authorities
1Comparison of the levels of public sector employees is made diﬃcult by the problems related to the diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of public sector. For example, in countries where a signiﬁcant part of hospitals and/or schools are private
- or even when they are publicly owned, but are classiﬁed outside the general government, because they are privately
managed - the costs borne by the government (as salaries) may be classiﬁed in the budget accounts under categories
other than the wage bill, such as social payments. On this issue a very detailed, although dated, survey is Heller and
Tait (1983).
1in European countries during the 1960s and the 1970s. During the ’90s the constraints related
to ﬁscal consolidation have played a role. As for the wage developments, studies have generally
found a positive wage premium for public sector employees; they typically use microeconomic data
in order to control for the quality and composition of public relative to private sector employees
(Gregory and Borland, 1999). Portugal and Centeno (2001) use the 1995 wave of the Europen
Union Household Panel to document the extent of the public sector wage premium for thirteen
european countries.
The peculiarity of the public employer’s ultimate goal is the natural candidate for the cause
of the diﬀerences between public and private sectors brieﬂy documented. Whereas the private
sector employer can be reasonably assumed to be a proﬁt maximizer, there are two main theoret-
ical approaches in the literature to understanding how public employer’s decisions will be made.2
One approach treats public sector decision-makers as making choices to achieve socially optimal
outcomes; the alternative approach introduces some personal objective of the politicians. Public
sector decision-makers who seek to maximize social welfare may have both eﬃciency and equity
goals. The eﬃciency goal can be manifested in diﬀerent ways. It may simply imply that politicians
or bureaucrats choose employment and earnings to minimize the costs of production of output in
the public sector. Or it may mean that employment is set in a way that is intended to resolve labor
market imperfections that exists elsewhere in the economy.
In this paper we assume that the public sector employer has primarily an eﬃciency goal. This
goal implies that, once the union has chosen the wage, he sets employment to maximize the proﬁt
associated with the public production.3 Furthermore, unionization in the private sector makes the
level of privately-chosen work and production too low. Reducing the unemployment rate in the
economy is also part of the government eﬃciency goal.4
Public sector employment and compensation levels will aﬀect private sector ones through both
the amount of taxes levied on the private sector labor income and, to the extent unions in the two
sectors cooperate, the wage setting process. In the end, the overall equilibrium in the labor market
will signiﬁcantly depend upon the determinants of wages and employment in the public sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the literature. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium in a fragmented public employees hiring
2For a discussion on the argument see Gregory and Borland (1999) and references therein.
3Measuring the eﬃciency achieved in the public sector production activity by the proﬁtm a yn o tb ec o n s i d e r e d
appropriate. However, it enables us to easily compare the outcomes obtained for the two sectors (private and public),
while not aﬀecting the qualitative features of the model.
4I no u rm o d e lt h ec a s eo fac o m p e t i t i v el a b o rm a r k e ti nthe private sector can be thought of as an extreme
case. Under such a circumstance the government’s additional goal concerning the overall level of employment in the
economy, which makes the public employer distinguishable from the private sector one, vanishes and the problem
becomes trivial.
2setup, both in the presence of sector-speciﬁc unions and in the presence of an encompassing one;
section 5 considers the alternative situation, in which public sector units coordinate their hiring
decisions and take into account the aggregate budget constraint. Section 6 presents a numerical
simulation and section 7 shows some empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
Given the relevance, both in terms of levels and variations, of public employment is somehow sur-
prising that: i) there are very few studies that try to deepen the understanding of the characteristics
of public sector employment; ii) analyses of the labor market usually tend to ignore the eﬀects on
the overall employment levels of the interactions between public and private sector labor demand.
In each of the last two issues of the Handbook of Labor Economics there is a chapter on Public
Sector Labor Markets. In the 1986 Handbook the authors (Ehrenberg and Schwarz) discuss ex-
tensively the reason for having a separate chapter on public sector employment. It emerges that
public employment in the US had been growing very quickly between 1950 and 1975, together with
unionization among public employees, and that public sector wages were higher than comparable
private sector ones over the same period. This evidence spurred a relevant amount of research
aimed at assessing the extent and the reasons of the public sector wage premium. In particular,
the concern was that unionization would lead to higher wages and, therefore, higher public expen-
diture. Overall, the ﬁndings on the US experience pointed to a limited wage premium due to union
membership or collective bargaining coverage (typically of the order of 10%) and suggested that
the eﬀects of unions on wages were lower in the public sector that in the private one. Also, the
demand elasticities for public sector workers were found to be negative for most categories of labor;
however, there was some evidence, although not strong, that the elasticities were lower in absolute
value than those estimated for the private sector.
In the 1999 Handbook the authors (Gregory and Borland) analyze a wider set of issues and take
also a cross-country perspective. The chapter stresses the importance of using microeconomic data
to control for composition and skill heterogeneity in analyzing the public sector wage premium. The
premium, which is found in most analysis (even if of a smaller size when using microeconomic data)
is put in relation to the degree of unionization. However, the way unions aﬀects the wage premium
is not entirely understood. The monopoly union model, for example, predicts that unionization
increases wages at the expense of lower employment; the latter prediction is not supported by the
empirical evidence.
The negative eﬀect of unionization on employment levels can be mitigated by two factors.
3First, unions may be able to shift out the demand curve for labor through political pressure;
second, unions may be able to implement eﬃcient bargaining where both wage and employment
can increase relative to the situation that would prevail in the absence of unionization.5 One
attempt to distinguish between these two explanations is in O’Brien (1994). He found, for US police
and ﬁre services employees, that political activity has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on employment,
whereas collective bargaining has an insigniﬁcant or negative eﬀect. This ﬁnding would support
the hypothesis that union eﬀects on employment operate through a demand-shift eﬀect rather than
through the bargaining over wages and employment (eﬃcient bargaining). Gregory and Borland
also show that trade union density6 is higher for public sector than for private sector employees in
most developed countries. In some countries, such as the US, the increase in public sector union
density since the 1960s has contrasted with decreases in private sector union density. Institutional
and legal factors seem the most important ones in explaining these developments.
Few papers analyze the various form of interaction between public and private sector employ-
ment levels. A notable exception is Holmlund (1993 and 1997). Holmund (1993) proposes an
explanation for the public sector wage premium based on the idea that any wage increase for the
public sector employees is borne mainly by private sector employees through an increase in taxation.
This externality would lead the public sector union, only concerned about public employees, to ask
for higher wages. Holmund (1997) analyzes a model where an increase in public wage or employ-
ment, by increasing the reservation utility of private sector workers and their bargaining power,
leads to an increase in the private sector wage and a reduction in the private sector employment.
Both models suggest that there may be a negative relationship between public and private sector
employment. The partial crowding out of private employment by employment in the public sector
may come from higher taxes and higher reservation wages. On this issue there is some empirical
evidence. Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) report evidence of a partial crowding out of about
30%. They regress overall employment levels on public employment and a series of control variables
obtaining an estimate of 0.7 for the public employment coeﬃcient. A similar approach is taken
by Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002). They ﬁnd an even stronger crowding out eﬀect of public
employment.
As in the papers by Holmund (1993 and 1997), we assume that the interaction between public
and private sector employment levels hinges on the idea that wages for the public sector employees
are ﬁnanced by taxes on private sector labor income. In our model, wages in the two sectors are
set by monopoly unions, which can either act cooperatively or uncooperatively across sectors.
5On this see the classical work of McDonald and Solow (1981).
6Union density is measured by dividing union members by the number of wage- and salary-earners in total
employment.
4While the employer in the private sector is assumed to be a proﬁt maximizer, the choice of the
public employer’s objective function relies on both theoretical considerations and empirical ﬁndings.
The existing evidence suggests that, for most categories of labor in the public sector, employment
exhibits a relatively low wage elasticity. Furthermore, a public sector wage premium shows up for
most countries and periods of analysis. These two facts can be explained by a model in which the
public employer is concerned not only about proﬁts but also about the overall level of employment
in the economy. The presence of this additional objective, as we will see later in the paper, may
either generate a wage premium or not depending on the institutional setup (i.e., the degree of
coordination in both hiring and wage setting processes); it deﬁnitely decreases the wage elasticity
of the demand for public employment. The weak relationship between wage and employment that
is observed in the data may also be due to the ability of unions to outward shift the labor demand
curve; this may be achieved either by exerting some sort of political inﬂuence or, as in our paper,
by strategically setting wages in the two sectors.
3 The model
The economy consists of a large number of productive units: n of them are privately owned and all
identical; ng are public and all identical to each other. Public units can be thought of as decisional
units of the central government or local governments. The private sector is represented by standard
proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrms. In both public and private sectors wages are set unilaterally by a monopoly
union.
Given the wage quoted by the union, each employer chooses the number of workers so as to
maximize its utility function. Although hiring decisions in the public sector may occur at the
unit level, taxes are assumed to be set by the central government to satisfy an aggregate budget
constraint; they are imposed on the private sector labor income and serve to ﬁnance the expenditure
for public employment.
The situation can be described by a noncooperative dynamic game between the private and the
public sectors, where each sector is represented by ﬁrm-union pairs. The equilibrium concept we
focus on is the perfect Nash solution: negotiations in both sector occur simultaneously, each sector
taking as given what happens in the other one.7
7We can assume instead that the game between private and public sectors’ unions is Stackelberg (with the union
in the public sector being the leader), rather than Nash. This setup better characterizes a situation, perhaps more
realistic in some economies, in which the behavior of unions in the private sector is somehow aﬀected by the agreements
reached in the public sector. In the case of fragmented governments, in which by assumption the overall budget
constraint is not internalized by the individual government unit, the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the one
obtained under Nash behavior. In contrast, when the government is centralized (that is, when each decisional unit
takes into account the eﬀects that changes in the public wage bill may have on the level of taxation and, hence, on
5The timing of the game is the following. In period 1 unions in private and public sectors set the
wage in their own sector that is going to prevail until the end of the game. In period 2 private ﬁrms
and public units observe the wage quoted by the unions and choose the volume of employment. The
analysis will focus on symmetric equilibria where all ﬁrm-union pairs have the same expectations
and make the same choice. We will consider diﬀerent degrees of coordination, concerning both
governments’ and unions’ decision processes.
Coordination in government’s behavior is assumed to entail acknowledgement, during the hiring
process at the unit level, of the central government budget constraint, which, by assumption, must
hold for the economy as a whole only. We deﬁne such a setup a centralized-government economy.8
In contrast, in a fragmented setting hiring decisions are taken by each decisional unit (at the central
or local level) without taking into account the eﬀect that an increase in the public wage bill may
have on the overall level of taxation and, consequently, on the private sector after-tax wage and
employment.
Coordination in unions’ behavior is assumed to imply cooperation between unions in public and
private sectors. Under uncoordinated behavior each union is assumed to care only about workers in
its own sector and to set the wage taking the wage rate in the other sector as parametric to its wage
choice. In contrast, under perfect coordination the union confederation chooses wages in public and
private sectors to maximize the sum of utilities of employees in both sectors. Cooperation among
unions, associated with coordination in government’s behavior, results in a Stackelberg strategy:
the union confederation sets wages in the two sectors while fully recognizing the government’s
employment and tax responses.
All situations are summarized in Table 1.
3.1 The private sector
The private sector consists of n price-taking identical ﬁrms. The representative ﬁrm is characterized
by a proﬁt function, F(L) − w(1 + τ)L,w h e r eF(L) is the production function relating output to
labor, w is the net wage, τ is the tax rate on labor income9, and the output price is normalized to
unity. The technology is given by the logarithm of the Cobb-Douglas production function:10
F(L)=AlogL, (1)
the private sector after-tax wage and employment) diﬀerent mechanisms operate in opposite directions and no clear
intuition about the consequences from shifting from a Nash to a Stackelberg setup can be easily drawn.
8Formally, this situation can be described by having a third player moving in period 0 and imposing the central
government budget constraint.
9We assume here, without loss of generality, that taxes on labor income increase the labor cost.
10In order to rule out negative levels of output, we may impose a constraint on the technology such that F(L)=
AlogL for L>1a n dF(L)=0o t h e r w i s e .
6Table 1: Degrees of coordination
Fragmented government Fragmented government
and and
non-cooperative unions cooperative unions
Centralized government Centralized government
and and
non-cooperative unions cooperative unions
where A>0 is a productivity parameter. Firms maximize proﬁt s ,t a k i n gw a g e sa n dt a x e sa sg i v e n .





which exhibits constant wage elasticity equal to one.
3.2 The government
The representative government, as any other employer in the private sector, is assumed to care
about the proﬁt generated by the production of a good.11
Unlike employers in private sector, the government is also assumed to be concerned, either for
altruistic or for political motives, about the overall level of employment in the economy, that is the
sum of private and public sector workers.12 In particular, we assume that it wants to keep total
employment as close as possible to a target level ¯ L.13 This second argument in the government’s
utility function should account for the main diﬀerences between public and private employers’
objectives. Although we are aware that the public employer’s concern about total employment
does not exhaust all such diﬀerences, it enables us to characterize a demand for public employment
11In this model the issue of how the proﬁt from the government production is used is not explicitely addressed.
A possibility is to assume that the revenue from selling the good, together with taxes on private incomes, is used
to ﬁnance public sector wages. However, if we include the proﬁt in the government budget constraint the results
presented in the paper will not change qualitatively. The change will only aﬀect the size of the crowding-out eﬀect
of public on private employment.
12In this model the presence of a monopoly union makes the level of privately chosen work too low. Therefore the
government would value actions that raise the employment level above its natural level.
13We assume ¯ L large enough, so that ¯ L − Lg − L is always greater than zero.
7that exhibits, as the empirical evidence seems to suggest, a moderately negative wage elasticity.
Other objectives, in addition to proﬁt maximization, would do the job.14
Let Lg and wg denote the number of employed workers and the wage rate in public sector,
respectively. Let G(Lg) be the production function. We assume, as usual, that G(0) = 0 and
G(Lg)i sc o n c a v e . 15 Then, the representative government’s optimal choice of Lg responds to the
objective of maximizing the value of the following utility function:16
Ug = G(Lg) − wgLg − α(¯ L − L − Lg)2. (3)
The parameter α represents the weight that the government assign to the total employment
objective.17
The central government always satisﬁes its budget constraint, which implies that taxes raised
from workers in the private sector must equal the sum of wages paid to public-sector workers18
τwL = wgLg. (4)
In a coordinated government economy the budget constraint is taken into account in all decision
processes; under an uncoordinated hiring setup it only holds ex-post.
3.3 The union
The union in the private sector represents N members, all alike. L of them are employed in the
private sector and achieve a level of utility u(w). Analogously, the union in the public sector
14There have been two main approaches in the literature to model the objectives of public sector decision-makers.
One approach has been to treat them as being exclusively concerned with achieving eﬃcient outcomes. The alternative
approach speciﬁes an objective function which places some weight on personal or political objective. Empirical
evidence provides support for both types of theoretical approaches (Gregory and Borland, 1999). Our model attempts
to account for both motivations.
15While, for expositional simplicity, we choose the logarithmic form for the production function in the private
s e c t o r ,w ep r e f e rh e r et ok e e pt h ep r o b l e ma sg e n eral as possible, and thus not to impose any speciﬁc functional form.
16Whereas in the centralized government setup the overall unemployment motive is quite natural, in a fragmented
context it may be less intuitive. However, both when public units are thought of as local governments or as decisional
units (or ministries) of the central government the same problem at the aggregate level applies to each territorial or
decisional unit (i.e., the local government or ministry j maximizes Ug,j = G(Lg,j) − wg,jLg,j − α( ¯ Lj − Lj − Lg,j)
2).
If public units are thought of as local governments, then the target level of employment naturally applies to the
geographical area; if instead they are thought of as decisional units of the central government the target level of
employment may refer to a speciﬁc sector of the economy that the ministry is assumed to be particularly concerned
about.
17It seems reasonable to assume that the value of this parameter may vary substantially across countries, as diﬀerent
programs for employment protection may be envisaged. In particular, the value should be small in the presence of
important unemployment compensation schemes, such as generous social security systems or easily accessible inability
pension schemes.




j=1 wg,jLg,j, where the subscripts i and
j identify the productive unit. In a symmetric equilibrium, with all identical units, the budget constraint becomes
τnwL = ngwgLg. Without loss of generality we assume n = ng.
8represents Ng members. Lg of them are employed in the public sector and achieve a level of utility
u(wg). u(x) is the standard sort of concave utility function. If not employed a worker achieves a
level of utility ¯ u, which can be thought of as the utility from leisure. It is assumed for simplicity
that, because of ﬁrm-speciﬁc abilities or other reasons, there is no mobility of workers between
ﬁrms. This is a short-cut to avoid a general equilibrium analysis where the agents have to guess
the distribution of wages in the rest of the economy.
The unions in the private and in the public sectors wish to maximize u(w)L +( N − L)¯ u and
u(wg)Lg+(Ng−Lg)¯ u, respectively, which can be written as [u(w)−¯ u]L+N¯ u and [u(wg)−¯ u]Lg+Ng¯ u.
Since N, Ng and ¯ u are treated as data for the purpose of union wage setting the problems can
be summarized by saying that unions wish to maximize the membership’s aggregate gain from
employment, over and above the utility ¯ u that every member starts with.
Under non-cooperative union behavior, the union in one sector sets the wage taking as given
wage and employment in the other sector. That is, the union in the private sector chooses w to
maximize
Unc
u =[ u(w) − ¯ u]L(w), (5)
where the superscript nc stands for non-cooperative behavior. Analogously, the union in the public
sector sets wg to maximize
Unc
u,g =[ u(wg) − ¯ u]Lg(wg). (6)
In the presence of cooperative behavior, the encompassing union sets wages in the private and
in the public sectors to maximize
Uc
u = u(w)L(w)+u(wg)L(wg) − ¯ u[L(w)+Lg(wg)], (7)
where the superscript c stands for cooperative behavior.
In our analysis we focus on a simple monopoly union model, which represents a union as choosing
wages subject to a labor demand constraint. More complicated institutional arrangements are
necessary for the achievement of ”eﬃcient bargains”, where the union bargaining activity forces
the wage/employment outcome oﬀ the labor demand curve to an eﬃcient contracts-type outcome.19
4 The fragmented-government economy
In this economy both wage setting and hiring processes occur at the unit level, neither the gov-
ernment decisional units nor the unions recognizing the central government’s tax response to their
19An accurate analysis of diﬀerent models of union behavior is provided by McDonald and Solow (1981).
9choices. The unions may either act cooperatively, setting simultaneously the wage rate in both
private and public sectors, or uncooperatively.
The representative government unit chooses Lg to maximize utility (3), given L.T h a ti s ,t h e
public employer does not take into account the eﬀect of its employment choice on taxes and, hence,
on private employment. The public sector demand for labor is given by the following ﬁrst-order
condition:
G0(Lg) − wg +2 α(¯ L − Lg − L)=0 . (8)
The ﬁrst two terms of this equation represent the marginal proﬁt; the last term is the marginal
beneﬁt from a reduction in the diﬀerence between actual and desired levels of total employment
due to an increase in public employment. As long as 2α(¯ L−Lg −L) > 0, that is total employment
in public and private sectors is below the desired level, the value of Lg that solves this problem is
higher than the one that simply maximizes the proﬁt.








By virtue of the concavity of the production function, the demand is always decreasing in
the wage. The slope depends on the parameter α: the higher α, that is the higher the weight
that the government assigns to total employment, the lower the sensitivity of labor demand to
changes in the wage rate. The intuition is straightforward: the more concerned is the government
about discrepancies between actual and desired levels of employment the less reactive it is to proﬁt
maximization considerations. For high enough values of α the labor demand in public sector may
turn out to be almost unrelated to the wage.
4.1 Non-cooperative union behavior
The best wage for the representative union to set is determined in the obvious way by the tangency
of an indiﬀerence curve with the employer’s labor demand curve. Mathematically, in the private
sector this amounts to ﬁnding the maximum of (5) with respect to w, subject to the demand for
labor (2).20 The equilibrium wage solves the following ﬁrst-order condition:
u0(w)w − [u(w) − ¯ u]=0 , (10)
20The payoﬀ of the ﬁrm from the agreement is its proﬁt and that of the union is the total utility received by its
members. Therefore, agreements are generally restricted to be wages for which the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is non-negative
and the union members’ utility is at least ¯ u.
10which can be rearranged as
u0(w)w
u(w) − ¯ u
− 1=0 . (11)
The ﬁrst term is the elasticity of the gain from employment, u(w) − ¯ u, with respect to the wage.
The second term is the wage elasticity of the demand for labor. The condition is thus that the two
elasticities should be equal. The second-order condition is fulﬁlled by virtue of the concavity of the
utility function.
Analogously, the representative union in the public sector sets the wage to maximize (6), subject
to the public employer’s reaction function, equation (8), taking L as given.
The Lagrangian for the public sector union’s problem takes the form
L =[ u(wg) − ¯ u]Lg + λ[G0(Lg) − wg +2 α(¯ L − Lg − L)], (12)
where λ is the multiplier associated with the government’s demand for labor. The ﬁrst-order
conditions are:
Lg : u(wg) − ¯ u + λ[G00(Lg) − 2α]=0 , (13)
wg : u0(wg)Lg − λ =0 , (14)
λ : G0(Lg) − wg +2 α(¯ L − Lg − L)=0 . (15)
Combining equations (13) and (14) and rearranging, we get
u0(wg)wg





that implies, as for the private sector, that the wage elasticity of the gain from employment and
that of the demand for labor must be equal in equilibrium. Notice however that, in the presence
of the same technology in the two sectors, i.e. for G(L)=F(L): (i) if wages were set equal
across sectors, the demand for labor in the public sector would be higher than that in the private
sector (i.e., from ﬁrst-order condition (15), the labor demand shifts up as α increases); (ii) for
same levels of employment, the slope of the labor demand in the public sector is lower than that
in the private sector (i.e., from equation (9), the slope of the labor demand decreases with α); it
however increases with the level of employment (because of the presence of the term G00(Lg)i nt h e
denominator). That is, the presence in the government’s utility function of the total employment
argument may either increase or decrease the wage elasticity of the labor demand. By comparing
conditions (11) and (16) it thus follows that in equilibrium both wg >wand wg <wmay occur.
In particular, whenever the eﬀect on the slope induced by a higher level of employment is small
enough a public-sector wage premium arises in our model.
11Let wFncdenote the equilibrium private-sector wage in a fragmented-government economy under
non-cooperative union behavior, as given by the solution to equation (11). Then, the equilibrium
levels of private employment, LFnc, the tax rate, τFnc, employment and wage in the public sector,
LFnc
g and wFnc
g respectively, are obtained by solving the system of equations (2), (4), (15) and (16),
where w = wFnc.
4.2 Cooperative union behavior
The objective function of a centralized encompassing union is given by equation (7). The relevant
Lagrangian for this problem is thus
L =[ u(wg) − ¯ u]Lg +[ u(w) − ¯ u]L + λ[G0(Lg) − wg +2 α(¯ L − Lg − L)], (17)
where L is given by the private sector labor demand equation, (2).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are now:
Lg : u(wg) − ¯ u + λ[G00(Lg) − 2α]=0 , (18)
wg : u0(wg)Lg − λ =0 , (19)
w : u0(w)w − [u(w) − ¯ u]+2 αλ =0 , (20)
λ : G0(Lg) − wg +2 α(¯ L − Lg − L)=0 . (21)
The only diﬀerence between the solutions to this case and the one assuming non-cooperative
union behavior regards the ﬁrst-order condition for w. Substituting λ from equation (18) into (20)
and rearranging, we obtain
u0(w)w
u(w) − ¯ u + 2α
G00(Lg)−2α[u(wg) − ¯ u]
− 1=0 . (22)
By comparing equations (22) and (11), it shows that the gain from employment under cooperative
behavior is reduced, with respect to that under non-cooperative behavior, by the term 2α[u(wg)−
¯ u]/[G00(Lg) − 2α]. This term takes into account the fact that, due to the government’s concern
about the overall level of employment, an increase in employment in private sector, induced by a
decrease in the wage request in the private sector, determines a reduction in public employment,
and viceversa.21
As a consequence, the cooperative union will always ask a higher wage for the private sector
than a non-cooperative one. With respect to the case with non-cooperative union behavior, the
21More formally, the gain from employment in the private sector for a cooperative union is given by u(w) − ¯ u +
(∂Lg/∂L)[u(wg)−¯ u]. Diﬀerentiating equation (21) with respect to Lg and L we obtain ∂Lg/∂L =2 α/[G00(Lg)−2α].
12equilibrium will be characterized by higher wages and lower employment in the private sector and
by lower wages and higher employment in the public sector. 22 Therefore, cooperation among
unions in the two sectors tends to make the public-sector wage premium lower.
5 The centralized-government economy
In this economy decisional units of the central and local government coordinate their hiring decisions
internalizing the aggregate budget constraint; the union sets wages nationwide, either cooperatively
or non-cooperatively across sectors. Both the public employer and the union fully recognize the
eﬀect of their choices on the central government budget constraint and, through the equilibrium
tax rate, on private employment.
Substituting τ from the government budget constraint (4) into the private sector labor demand,






Equation (23) implies that, due to the presence of a budget constraint, an increase in public sector
employment crowds out employment in private sector.
The government chooses Lg to maximize utility (3), subject to (23). The ﬁrst-order condition
of this problem gives the public sector demand for labor as a function of both wages in private and
public sectors







Comparing equations (24) and (8), we notice that the diﬀerence in the demand for public employ-
ment between the uncoordinated and the coordinated government economy is given by the last
term, that is the marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in the gap between actual and desired levels of
total employment due to an increase in public employment. With coordinated hiring processes, this
marginal beneﬁt is reduced by the presence of the multiplicative term, with negative sign, wg/w.
This ratio, from (23), is simply the derivative of L with respect to Lg, and thus indicates by how
much public employment crowds out private employment.23 In particular, if the ratio is higher
than one, that is in the presence of a positive wage premium in the public sector, it will be optimal
for the government, as far as the second objective is concerned, to substitute private employment
22The equilibrium wage in the public sector, i.e. the value of wg that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition (16), is
indeed lower in the presence of cooperative unions if the wage elasticity of the labor demand increases with Lg.
23Algan, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002) obtain the same result in a diﬀerent model, where the crowding out eﬀect on
private employment associated with an increase in wg or Lg comes from an increase in the number of active persons
looking for a job in the public sector and a corresponding decrease of those looking for a job in the private sector.
13for public employment. Therefore, the value of Lg that solves this problem is always lower than
the one that solves the problem in a fragmented-government setting. Moreover, with respect to the
case of a proﬁtm a x i m i z e rﬁrm, here labor demand will be higher or lower, depending on whether
wg i sl o w e ro rg r e a t e rt h a nw.




1+2 α/w[(¯ L − Lg − L) − Lg(1 − wg/w)]
G00(Lg) − 2α(1 − wg/w)2 . (25)
In the presence of a large enough level of ¯ L, and whenever wg >w , the term in the square brackets
is greater than zero, so that the demand for labor is decreasing in the wage. Furthermore, for values
of the wage premium not extremely high 24, the demand for labor is steeper under centralized than
under fragmented government, the diﬀerence in the slope increasing with α. As a matter of fact,
the incentive for the government to expand employment in the public sector, in order to ﬁll the gap
between actual and desired level of total employment, is lower in a centralized-government economy
than in a fragmented-government economy, as in the presence of centralized hiring processes the
government fully recognizes the crowding out eﬀect of public on private employment. Therefore,
in this last setting the wage elasticity of the demand for public employment is higher and closer to
that resulting from a usual proﬁt maximization problem.
5.1 Non-cooperative union behavior
The problem faced by the union in the private sector is to maximize (5) with respect to w,s u b j e c t
to equation (23), i.e. the labor demand in the private sector that results once the government
budget constraint has been taken into account, and the government reaction function, equation
(24). In both equations (23) and (24) wg is taken as given, as it is chosen uncooperatively by the
union in the public sector.
The Lagrangian for this problem is thus
L =[ u(w) − ¯ u]L + λ
·







where L is as in equation (23).











24It is easy to prove that the condition wg < 2w is suﬃcient to generate the result.


















Combining equations (27) and (28) and rearranging, we obtain
u0(w)w




(wg/w)[(wg/w)(¯ L − Lg − L)+L(1 − wg/w)]
L[G00(Lg) − 2α(1 − wg/w)2]
#
=0 , (30)
where the last term in squared brackets is the elasticity of the labor demand in the private sector in
the presence of coordinated government behavior. It is higher than under a fragmented government,
as in the presence of a centralized government there are two eﬀects on the labor demand that the
union has to take into account when increasing its wage request. The ﬁrst is the usual fall in
the demand for labor due to an increase in its price. The second operates through the increase
in employment in the public sector, and therefore in taxes, induced by the initial decrease in
employment in the private sector.
Analogously, the relevant Lagrangian for the union in the public sector is
L =[ u(wg) − ¯ u]Lg + λ
·







where L is again as in equation (23).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are now:

























Combining equations (32) and (33) and rearranging, we obtain
u0(wg)wg
u(wg) − ¯ u
+
wg{1+( 2 α/w)[(¯ L − Lg − L)] − Lg(1 − wg/w)]}
Lg[G00(Lg) − 2α(1 − wg/w)2]
=0 , (35)
that implies again that the wage elasticity of the gain from employment and that of the labor
demand in the public sector must be equal in equilibrium.
The wage elasticities of the labor demand in both the private and the public sectors are higher in
a centralized government economy than in a fragmented one.25 As a consequence, both private and
public sectors’ equilibrium wages are lower under a centralized than under a fragmented government.
25For the public sector this is true provided that the wage premium is not excessively high (see the previous
footnote).
15As long as the eﬀect of centralization in the hiring process on wages is stronger in the public sector
than in the private one, higher coordination among governments decreases the wage premium.
Unsurprisingly, with respect to the fragmented government case, in equilibrium wages will be
lower and employment will be higher.
5.2 Cooperative union behavior
Finally, in the presence of coordinated public hiring process and cooperative union behavior the
problem can be stated as follows. The union maximizes its utility (7) with respect to both w and
wg, taking into account both private and public sector employers’ reaction functions.
The Lagrangian for this problem is thus
L =[ u(wg) − ¯ u]Lg +[ u(w) − ¯ u]L + λ
·







where L is again as in equation (23).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are now:
Lg : u(wg) − ¯ u −
wg






































Combining equations (37) and (38) and rearranging, we obtain
u0(wg)wg − (wg/w)[u(w) − ¯ u]
u(wg) − ¯ u − (wg/w)[u(w) − ¯ u]
+
wg{1+( 2 α/w)[(¯ L − Lg − L)] − Lg(1 − wg/w)]}
Lg[G00(Lg) − 2α(1 − wg/w)2]
=0 . (41)
The second term in this expression is the usual wage elasticity of the public sector labor demand in a
centralized government economy. The ﬁrst term is the wage elasticity of the gain from employment
in the public sector. It is more complicated than in a fragmented-government setting, as the union
now recognizes that an increase of one unit in public sector employment reduces private employment
by wg/w units. Moreover, a cooperative union cares about employees in both sectors. Therefore
the gain from employment in the public sector is no longer equal to u(wg)− ¯ u but it is smaller and
equal to u(wg) − ¯ u − (wg/w)[u(w) − ¯ u]; analogously, the marginal gain is u0(wg) − [u(w) − ¯ u]/w
instead of u0(wg).
Hence, in equilibrium the usual condition on wage elasticities must apply.
As far as the choice of the private-sector wage is concerned, dividing equation (39) by equation
(37) and rearranging we obtain the optimality condition, which can be expressed in terms of the
16usual condition on elasticities:
u0(w)w − (w/wg)[u(wg) − ¯ u]




(wg/w)[(wg/w)(¯ L − Lg − L)+L(1 − wg/w)]
L[G00(Lg) − 2α(1 − wg/w)2]
#
=0 . (42)
The ﬁrst term is the wage elasticity of the gain for the encompassing union from employment in
the private sector. Notice that in this case the gain in the private sector induced by an increase of
one unit in private employment, u(w)− ¯ u, is reduced by the associated cost induced by a reduction
of w/wg units in the public sector, (w/wg)[u(wg) − ¯ u]. The last term in squared brackets is again
the elasticity of the labor demand in the private sector in the presence of coordinated government
behavior.
6 A numerical simulation
In this section we show the results of a numerical simulation. This allows us to easily describe some
implications of the diﬀerent institutional setups analyzed in the model.
In the simulation we assume the same technology in the private and in the public sector, i.e.
G(L)=AlogL, and the same utility from employment in both sectors, i.e. u(w)=wβ and
u(wg)=wβ
g. The parameters take the following values: A =5 ,α =0 .3, β =0 .5, ¯ u =1 ,¯ L =3 . 26
The results, as for wage and employment levels in the private and in the public sector, the wage
premium, the tax rate, government’s and union’s utilities, under the four institutional setups are
presented in Table 2. We measure the public-sector wage premium as wg/w. The utility of the
union is the sum of the utilities achieved by the unions in the private and in the public sector, even
under a non-cooperative union behavior setup.
The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:27
(i) cooperation among unions increases wages and reduces employment in the private sector; it,
generally, results in lower wages and higher employment in the public sector;
(ii) centralization in government behavior induces wage moderation and higher employment in
both sectors, under non cooperative union behavior; with union cooperation the eﬀect of central-
ization is ambiguous;
(iii) a public-sector wage premium may or may not occur; it decreases if unions cooperate.
26In order to obtain sensible values for the tax rate, in the numerical simulation we assume the following budget
constraint: wgLg = τwL+ K,w h e r eK can be thought of as any kind of revenue that is unrelated to labor income.
We set K =4 .5. Of course, the presence of this term does not aﬀect the equilibrium conditions.
27The solution presented here is unrestricted. If we had imposed the non-negative proﬁt condition, we would have
obtained, in the case of centralized government and cooperative unions, a ﬁn i t ev a l u ef o rt h ew a g ei nt h ep r i v a t e
sector (w) and, consequently, positive amounts for the employment level in the private sector (L), the tax rate (τ)
and the wage premium, (wg/w).
17Table 2: Results of the numerical simulation
Fragmented government Centralized government
Non-cooperative unions Cooperative unions Non-cooperative unions Cooperative unions
Lg 1.235 1.332 1.392 1.545
wg 4.522 4.367 3.588 4.108
L 0.979 0.65 1.262 ≈ 0
w 4 5.675 3.566 ≈∞
wg
w 1.13 0.769 1.006 ≈ 0
τ 0.276 0.357 0.111 ≈ 0
Uu 2.37 2.349 2.367 2.801
Ug -5.56 -5.839 -4.702 -6.548
18As far as welfare is concerned, the government is better oﬀ i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fn o n - c o o p e r a t i v e
union behavior, whereas the union beneﬁts from cooperation. From the union point of view, the ﬁrst
best outcome is achieved under a centralized government setup with cooperative union behavior.
As a matter of fact, in this situation the union, which moves ﬁrst, is able to take into account
all relevant information. The eﬀect of centralization on government’s utility is instead ambiguous.
The government obtaines a lower disutility in the presence of a centralized hiring setup if unions
do not cooperate, in the presence of a fragmented hiring setup otherwise.
7 Empirical evidence
In this section we present preliminary evidence on some of the implications of the theoretical model.
Our focus is on estimating the eﬀects of government fragmentation and union cooperation on wage
and employment levels in both the private and the public sector. To this end we use a panel of data
drawn from the 2001 OECD Economic Outlook. The sample covers the period 1960-2000 and the
following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK and USA.
Accurate measures of the degree of government fragmentation and union cooperation are not
available. In our framework, fragmentation means that the spending units do not internalize the
budget constraint at all. This assumption is the extreme version of the well known ”common-
pool problem”, in which spending units compete for government expenditure that are ﬁnanced
through broad bases taxes. Since the cost of higher spending is broadly dispersed, while the
beneﬁts (primarily higher spending on particular projects, on transfer programs or similar) are
concentrated, spending units have an incentive to over-spend in the sense that they would choose
lower levels of spending if they took the full cost into account. In this framework, the bias toward
higher spending increases the less the spending units take into account the externality created by
the general tax fund, which usually happens when the number of spending units increases and/or
when the decision-making process involves more parties. Although there is evidence that measures
of government fragmentation (as the number of spending ministries or the number of parties in
the government coalition) are correlated with the growth of spending in European countries during
the seventies and early eighties (on this see, among others, Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999, and
Volkerink and De Hann, 2001), they are not strongly correlated with the level of net borrowing
over the entire sample period we consider. In what follows, therefore, as a proxy for government
fragmentation we decided to use the level of total current expenditure (net of public employee
19compensations).
In our model the degree of union cooperation must be intended as the degree of centralization
in wage negotiations: a cooperative union is a nationwide union that negotiates for both private
and public sector employees; a non cooperative union is a union that negotiates at the sector level,
where the public sector should be considered as a sector on its own. In order to measure union
cooperation we rely on standard indexes of centralization in wage negotiations. In particular, we
use the one presented by the OECD in the 1997 Employment Outlook and the one developed by
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), from now on EMS. The OECD Employment Outlook 1997
reports values for three years (1980, 1990 and 1994). EMS provide information on the development
of the index for 19 OECD countries from 1980 up to the end of the 1990s. In Table 2A we report
the value of the indexes in three years (1980, 1990 and 1994); when the changes in the index are
described in qualitative terms by EMS (for example, an index gradually moving from 3 to 1 during
the 1990s), we assume a change at the midpoint (in the example, in 1995). These indexes are
constructed as sums of two diﬀerent measures: the ﬁrst one is the wage bargaining level (national,
industry, plant); the second one is a measure of the degree of coordination among unions’ (and
employers’) federations. This second measure captures the cooperation among unions and ﬁrms in
the wage bargaining process regardless of the level at which the negotiating process take place. We
will present results using also the EMS measure of the degree of cooperation.
On the basis of our model, we expect that: i) the employment level in the public sector increases
as the union becomes more cooperative and, for any given level of the wage rate, decreases as the
government becomes more centralized;28 ii) the employment level in the private sector decreases
as the union becomes more cooperative and, at least when unions act non cooperatively, increases
as the government becomes more centralized; iii) the public sector wage premium decreases with
union cooperation (while no clear-cut change with government’s fragmentation).
7.1 Employment levels
In order to explore the correlation among the relevant variables and to check whether these cor-
relations are consistent with the predictions of the model, we estimate two separate equations for
private and for public sector employment levels. Employment levels are expressed as a percentage
of total population. By dividing the employment level by total population we are able to capture
country diﬀerences in terms of population size and labor force while using a variable which is not
dependent on the cycle (as, for example, an alternative natural candidate, such as total dependent
28The public sector labor demand in the presence of a fragmented government is shifted inward and steeper than
with a centralized government. In this last case, however, unions will ask for a lower public sector wage rate and a
higher employment level may result in equilibrium.
20employment). Employees’ compensation is measured as the ratio of gross compensation, net of
social security contributions29, and per-capita GDP. The normalizations of employment and com-
pensation are important in order to reduce the heteroskedasticity in the residuals that would occur
were the diﬀerences across countries in the variables in levels signiﬁcant. Nominal variables, such
as the ﬁscal variables, are expressed as percentages of GDP.
For both private and public sector employment we run the following regression:
Empit = β0 + β1Writ + β2Centrit + β3Fragm it + β4Wr∗ Centrit + β5Wr∗ Fragmit +
β6Yrg it + β7Ggdit + β8Gapit + β9Poprit + θt + νi + ²it, (43)
where the subscripts i and t identify the country and the time, respectively, Emp is the (public
or private) employment level as a percentage of total population, Wr is the average wage rate
as a percentage of per-capita GDP, Centr is the index of centralization, Fragm is our measure
of fragmentation, Wr∗ Centr is the cross term of wage rate and centralization, Wr∗ Fragm is
the cross term of wage rate and fragmentation, Yrgis government’s total current revenue, Ggd is
government’s gross debt level, Gap is the OECD measure of the output gap and Popr measures
the dependency ratio (given as the ratio between total population and the population between 15
and 64 years), θt a r et i m ed u m m i e s ,νi is the country ﬁxed eﬀect and ²it is the residual term.
Table 3A reports some summary statistics.
Assuming ﬁxed eﬀect, we focus on time series variations. This is very important, since on
the right hand side of our regressions we have institutional variables which are likely correlated
with country speciﬁc (time invariant) unobservable characteristics. If the latter also aﬀect the
public and/or the private sector employment levels, it is very important to control for country ﬁxed
eﬀect in order to eliminate this source of bias. Analogously, aggregate shocks that inﬂuence ﬁscal
outcomes are likely to be correlated across countries. Year dummies can then parcel out the eﬀects
of these shocks if the latter are only partially captured by the macroeconomic variables we control
for (i.e. the output gap).
We also report results obtained assuming country speciﬁc linear trends (that is substituting νi
with the term
P
i γi·t and dropping the time dummies θt). This speciﬁcation is meant to control for
the possible bias due to the fact that the measure of employment level that we use is expressed in
physical units (not in eﬃciency units) while the composition of public employees in terms of skills
and education has changed over time and also relatively to that observed in the private sector.
29Most countries release data on compensations net of social security contributions; contributions on public em-
ployees are often consolidated and subtracted both on the revenue and on the expenditure side.
21Therefore, the productivity of the average public sector worker relative to the average economy-
wide one (which is captured by the average GDP at the denominator of Wr) has probably changed
over time. Similarly, private sector employees may have experienced a diﬀerent productivity growth
with respect to the average one. The country speciﬁc trend variables certainly will capture any
other trend which may characterize the data.
On top of our measures of government fragmentation, the regressions control for total current
revenue and gross debt level as a fraction of GDP. Current revenue are meant to capture the
amount of disposable resources (the dimension of the public sector); its level follows the cycle.
Countries with high levels of debt might be constrained in their choices by the necessity to conduct
ﬁscal consolidations; moreover, for any given level of the budget balance (diﬀerence between total
revenue and expenditure), countries with a higher level of public debt may have a lower share of
current expenditure to be spent on employees’ compensation, as interest payments are higher.
The cross term of the wage rate and the centralization index is included in order to capture the
fact that the correlation between the wage rate and the employment level depends on the degree
of union cooperation. In the model, a cooperative union will set a higher private sector wage
than a non cooperative one (and therefore a lower private sector employment). In so doing, it will
rise the demand for public sector employees, since the government will hire employees in order to
compensate for the decrease in private sector employment. Given that the production function of
the public sector is concave, this higher level of public employees will increase the wage elasticity
of the labor demand (see the term G
00
(Lg) in equation (9) and (25)). Therefore we expect β4 to be
negative. For the same reason, in the private sector the wage elasticity of the labor demand should
decrease (β4 positive) as the union become more cooperative. The cross term of the wage rate
and the fragmentation measure is included in order to control for the fact that higher government
centralization increases the labor demand elasticity both in the public and in the private sector
(see section 5.1 and 5.2). Therefore we expect β5 to be positive for both the private and the public
sector.
The measure of the output gap is introduced to control for the cycle and in particular to correct
for the possible bias introduced by the per-capita GDP normalization of the wage rate: in periods
of booms we should in fact expect an increase in both employment and GDP, therefore inducing a
negative correlation between the normalized wage rate and the employment level; the output gap
on the right hand side should, at least partially, correct for this distortion. Finally, the measure of
the dependency ratio is meant to capture the eﬀect of the demography on employment levels.
The results, reported in Table 4A, show signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the public and the private
sector. First of all, whereas in the private sector there is evidence of a negative correlation between
22the wage rate and the employment level, in the public sector this correlation is much lower and
positive. Although this evidence is compatible with a variety of reasons (such as the legislative
constraints on layoﬀs of public employees), on the basis of our model there are two eﬀects that
reduce the sensitivity of the employment level to changes in the wage rate in the public sector: i)
the slope of the demand curve in the public sector, which is less steep due to the fact that the
government has a target unemployment level; ii) the ability of unions, when acting cooperatively,
to shift out the demand for public employees through an increase in the private sector wage rate.
As argued, we use the level of government current expenditure (net of employees compensation)
as a proxy of the ability of public sector decisional units to coordinate their actions. More frag-
mentation implies - for any given level of revenues - a higher level of expenditure. As expected, our
proxy for government fragmentation is positively correlated with the level of public employment,
while a negative correlation exists for the private sector.
Table 4A shows also that the employment level is increasing in the degree of centralization
in the public sector, while no signiﬁcant correlation exits for the private sector. This evidence is
partly consistent with the prediction of our model that a cooperative union will always have the
incentive to rise private sector wage rates, reducing private sector employment, since this will lead
the government to increase public sector employment level (the demand shift eﬀect).
The sensitivity of the employment to the wage rate in the public sector increases with the degree
of centralization, while the relationship is not signiﬁcant in the private sector (this can be seen from
the coeﬃcient of Wr∗ Centr). We would have expected the elasticity of the demand to decrease
in the private sector: the model in fact predicts that cooperation among unions will lead to an
increase in the public sector employment and to a decrease in the private sector one. As far as the
second cross term is concerned (Wr∗Fragm) we would have expected a positive sign for both the
private and the public sector. The negative sign in the public sector regression is probably due to
the speciﬁc proxy of fragmentation that we have chosen; in fact the level of current expenditure,
being net of compensation, is by deﬁnition negatively correlated with the public sector wage bill
(and therefore with the public sector wage rate).
The results show a positive correlation between government current revenue and the employment
level in the public sector, while no signiﬁcant correlation exists for the private sector. Government
revenue are usually highly correlated with the cycle. In periods of downturn, revenue are low
and a higher fraction of current expenditure is absorbed by the automatic stabilizers (typically
unemployment beneﬁts and transfers). On the contrary, during expansions governments need to
spend less for automatic stabilizers and more resources are left to hire public employees. The debt
level is negatively correlated with public employment. In fact, for any given level of deﬁcit, a higher
23level of debt implies a lower level of expenditure other than interest payments.
Finally, the measure of the dependency ratio seems to have a positive demand eﬀect for both
public and private sector employees and this eﬀect seems to be higher for private employment. In
fact, it is not surprising that a variable capturing the eﬀect of the demography (as the dependency
ratio) over the period of analysis (1960-2000) is more correlated with the level of employment in
the private than in the public sector. The measure of the output gap is positively correlated with
the level of private employment; as expected, considering that the cycle aﬀect the budget mainly
through tax components, no signiﬁcant correlation exists with public sector employment.
Overall, the results of Table 4A show that public employment is not very sensitive to variations
in the wage rate; it increases with union cooperation and is highly correlated with ﬁscal measures.
Private sector employment is more sensitive to the wage rate; it is less correlated with ﬁscal vari-
ables. Although some of these results might be not surprising, they are consistent with the model
and signal relevant diﬀerences between private and public sector employment behavior.
7.2 The public sector wage premium
Next, we test the relationship between the public sector wage premium (i.e., the relative wage rate,
Rwr) and a set of variables similar to the ones of the employment regressions. We run the following
regression:
Rwrit = β0 + β1Rempit + β2Centrit + β3Fragm it + β4Rempit ∗ Centrit + β5Rempit ∗ Fragmit +
β6Yrg it + β7Ggdit + β8Gapit + β9Poprit + θt + νi + ²it (44)
where Remp is the ratio of the number of public employees and the number of private employees.
The other variables have the same meaning as before. Also in this case we run regressions with
ﬁxed eﬀects and country speciﬁc linear trends. Results are reported in table 7A.
The wage premium is negatively correlated with the relative employment levels. This is simply
the consequence of the strong negative relationship between the wage rate and the employment
level in the private sector. Moreover, the wage premium is negatively correlated with the degree of
centralization: more union cooperation leads to a lower wage premium. We have already stressed
that this is one important prediction of the model.
The level of total current expenditure has a negative (and signiﬁcant) correlation with the
premium. This is not in contrast with the model, which did not predict a clear relationship between
government fragmentation and wage premium. A higher level of revenue is positively correlated
24with the premium, while the level of debt does not have a signiﬁcant correlation. Finally, the
output gap and the dependency ratio variable are negatively correlated with the premium.
7.3 Robustness
Among the indexes used in the literature, the EMS index is the most updated and more reﬁned one
(in particular, EMS reported the changes of the index over time). However, centralization indexes
are rather arbitrary measures, partly based on subjective evaluations. It is therefore important to
check the robustness of the results using diﬀerent measures. In Table 5A,6A, 8A and 9A we run
the same regressions as in Table 4A and 7A simply changing the measure of centralization. In
particular we use also the index proposed by the OECD in the 1997 Employment Outlook and the
EMS index which measure only unions and employers cooperation (EMS cooperation index).
The results show similar patterns as when using the EMS centralization index. However, when
using the OECD 1997 index, the correlation between the private sector employment and central-
ization is positive and signiﬁcant. As for the wage premium, the results using the three diﬀerent
centralization indexes are very similar. Only, when using the OECD 1997 index the correlation
between the premium and the centralization index is not signiﬁc a n t .I tm u s tb es t r e s s e dt h a tt h e
OECD index covers 19 countries (Ireland is missing) and, therefore, when using it we loose some
observations.
In Tables 4A to 9A we have reported results for three regressions: one for the public sector
employment level, one for the private sector employment level and one for the wage premium. We
have argued that these regressions are intended to check for correlations that should qualitatively
hold in equilibrium (assuming our model is a good approximation of the economy). However, one
could try to give to these regressions a more structural interpretation. For example, we could argue
that the above regressions are linear conditional expectation functions (a strong assumption). In
this case, in order to get unbiased estimates of the coeﬃcients, we should take care of the endogeneity
problem: in fact, the wage rate in the employment regressions is probably correlated with the level
of employment; similarly, in the third regression, the relative employment rate is likely correlated
with the wage premium. We therefore tried to run the same regressions instrumenting the wage rate
(and the relative employment level) with its lag value. Not surprisingly, given the strong correlation
over time of wage rates and employment levels, the results (not shown) are substantially the same.
258 Final remarks
This paper has presented a model of wage and employment determination which distinguishes
between the private and the public sector. Among the important peculiarities of the public sec-
tor labor market we focus on those implied by the public employer’s objective. As a matter of
fact, whereas the private sector employer can be reasonably assumed to be a proﬁt maximizer,
understanding how public employer’s decisions are made is by far more complex.
We assumed that the public sector employer seeks to maximize social welfare, having primarily
an eﬃciency goal. This goal implies that he sets employment to maximize the proﬁt associated
with the public production. Reducing the unemployment rate in the economy is also part of his
eﬃciency goal. Wages are set in both sectors by monopoly unions.
We investigated the eﬀects on the labor market equilibrium of diﬀerent degrees of coordination
in both governments’ and unions’ decision processes.
The analysis predicts a weaker relationship between wages and employment in the public sector
than in the private sector. In particular, in our framework there are two factors that reduce the
sensitivity of the employment level to the wage rate in the public sector: i) the wage elasticity of
the labor demand, which for any given level of employment is lower in the public sector than in
the private sector, due to the government’s concern about the unemployment level in the overall
economy; ii) the ability of the unions, when acting cooperatively across sectors, to shift out the
demand for public employees through an increase in the private sector wage rate. In fact, a
cooperative union will always have the incentive to rise wages in the private sector, thereby reducing
private employment, as it knows that the government will react to lower private employment
by rising the public one. This in turn implies that higher degrees of cooperation among unions
increase the employment level in the public sector and decrease the wage premium. Finally, the
model suggests that public employment tends to be lower (and private employment higher) in the
presence of more budget conscious governments. The empirical evidence seems to support most of
these predictions.
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Table 1A: Public employees
Public employees as a percentage of total dependent employees
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000
Italy 14.7% 17.1% 20.7% 22.4% 22.9% 21.1%
Germany 10.5% 13.5% 16.5% 16.9% 14.3% 12.8%
France -- 22.2% 24.2% 26.1% 27.7% 26.6%
Spain -- 6.7% 12.3% 16.1% 17.9% 16.5%
Euro 11 -- -- 19.3% 21.1% 20.6% 19.1%
UK -- 19.9% 23.7% 27.1% 28.3% 26.7%
USA 14.9% 17.4% 17.7% 16.5% 16.2% 15.4%
Japan -- 11.9% 12.3% 10.5% 10.2% 10.2%
Canada -- 24.1% 23.5% 25.0% 26.0% 24.3%
Public employees as a percentage of total employed
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000
Italy 9.0% 12.2% 15.4% 17.3% 18.0% 16.7%
Germany 8.1% 11.2% 14.6% 15.1% 12.8% 11.5%
France -- 17.6% 20.4% 23.1% 24.9% 24.3%
Spain -- 4.9% 9.3% 13.8% 15.5% 14.3%
Euro 11 -- 11.8% 15.2% 17.1% 16.9% 15.8%
UK -- 18.3% 21.6% 22.9% 24.2% 23.4%
USA 12.7% 16.0% 16.4% 15.4% 15.4% 15.2%
Japan -- 7.7% 8.8% 8.1% 8.3% 8.4%
Canada -- 20.7% 20.4% 21.5% 21.9% 20.2%
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database, 200129
Table 2A: Centralization Indexes
Country Year OECD (1997) EMS (1998) EMS (1998)
Coordination
Austria 1980 3 3 3
1990 3 3 3
1994 3 3 3
Denmark 1980 3 3 3
1990 2 3 3
1994 2 3 3
Finland 1980 3 3 2
1990 3 2 2
1994 3 2 2
Norway 1980 3 3 3
1990 3 3 3
1994 3 3 3
Sweden 1980 3 3 3
1990 3 2 1
1994 2 2 2
Australia 1980 3 2 2
1990 3 1 1
1994 1 1 1
Belgium 1980 2 2 2
1990 2 2 2
1994 2 2 2
Germany 1980 3 3 3
1990 3 3 3
1994 3 3 3
Netherlands 1980 2 2 2
1990 2 3 3
1994 2 3 3
New Zealand 1980 1 2 1
1990 1 2 1
1994 1 1 1
Canada 1980 1 1 1
1990 1 1 1
1994 1 1 1
France 1980 1 2 2
1990 2 2 2
1994 2 2 2
Italy 1980 1 1 2
1990 1 1 2
1994 3 3 3
Japan 1980 2 1 3
1990 2 1 3
1994 2 1 3
Switzerland 1980 2 -- --
1990 2 -- --
1994 2 -- --
UK 1980 1 2 1
1990 1 1 1
1994 1 1 1
US 1980 1 1 1
1990 1 1 1
1994 1 1 1
Sources: OECD Employment Outlook, 1997 (OECD); Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998 (EMS).30
Table 3A: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard
Deviations
Min Max
Public employment (EG) 742 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.17
Private employment (EEP) 669 0.29 0.04 0.18 0.41
Relative employment (EMR) 701 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.60
Wage rate public (WRG) 673 1.81 0.65 0.69 5.62
Wage rate private (WR) 600 1.19 0.20 0.80 1.98
Wage premium (WAR) 607 1.53 0.52 0.50 4.78
Government current expenditure (YPG) 637 0.378 0.106 0.114 0.648
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (YPGW)
632 0.264 0.086 0.062 0.461
Government current revenue (YRG) 631 0.39 0.09 0.17 0.58
Government gross debt (GGFL) 530 0.57 0.26 0.10 1.34
Output gap (GAP) 598 -0.54 2.57 -11.31 7.30
Dependency ratio (POP) 750 1.53 0.08 1.31 1.7431
Table 4A: Regression results (EMS 1998 Centralization Index)
Fixed effects Country specific trend








Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Wage rate (Wr) 0.020 4.270 -0.273 -13.630 0.015 3.640 -0.260 -13.450
Centralization Index (Centr) 0.012 4.440 0.005 0.750 0.009 3.490 0.000 0.030
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
0.252 9.520 -0.980 -10.480 0.284 12.150 -0.828 -9.520
Cross term (Wr*Centr) -0.007 -5.840 -0.005 -0.900 -0.005 -4.680 -0.001 -0.140
Cross term (Wr*Ypgw) -0.105 -7.220 0.712 10.910 -0.095 -7.750 0.647 10.500
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 0.155 9.160 -0.029 -0.760 0.140 9.460 -0.006 -0.160
Gross government debt (Ggd) -0.031 -10.530 -0.013 -1.810 -0.035 -13.960 -0.020 -3.110
Output gap (Gap) 0.000 -0.740 0.001 3.370 0.000 0.520 0.002 5.270
Dependency ratio (Popr) 0.034 2.530 0.168 5.150 0.009 0.840 0.115 4.010




overall 0.729 0.044 0.983 0.940
Number of observations 421 404 421 40432
Table 5A: Regression results (OECD Employment Outlook 1997)
Fixed effects Country specific trend








Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Wage rate (Wr) 0.025 5.040 -0.281 -13.530 0.019 4.910 -0.262 -13.020
Centralization Index (Centr) 0.019 6.810 0.017 2.080 0.017 6.880 0.016 1.990
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
0.260 9.320 -1.091 -11.780 0.268 11.200 -0.939 -10.640
Cross term (Wr*Centr) -0.011 -6.580 -0.018 -2.400 -0.010 -6.510 -0.017 -2.300
Cross term (Wr*Ypgw) -0.098 -6.320 0.798 12.210 -0.082 -6.220 0.733 11.450
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 0.154 8.850 -0.011 -0.290 0.129 8.680 0.011 0.300
Gross government debt (Ggd) -0.032 -10.800 -0.007 -0.940 -0.037 -15.140 -0.016 -2.450
Output gap (Gap) 0.000 -0.510 0.001 1.960 0.000 0.340 0.001 3.930
Dependency ratio (Popr) 0.013 0.960 0.186 5.640 0.009 0.780 0.123 4.260




overall 0.722 0.008 0.984 0.935
Number of observations 401 384 401 38433
Table 6A: Regression results (EMS 1998 Only Coordination Index)
Fixed effects Country specific trend








Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Wage rate (Wr) 0.023 4.590 -0.266 -12.300 0.017 3.780 -0.257 -12.440
Centralization Index (Centr) 0.007 3.390 0.004 0.530 0.005 2.340 -0.001 -0.110
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
0.259 9.710 -0.967 -10.980 0.291 12.290 -0.825 -9.980
Cross term (Wr*Centr) -0.006 -5.540 -0.005 -0.950 -0.004 -4.170 -0.001 -0.160
Cross term (Wr*Ypgw) -0.118 -8.080 0.694 11.660 -0.105 -8.440 0.643 11.230
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 0.156 9.630 -0.032 -0.870 0.141 9.700 -0.008 -0.230
Gross government debt (Ggd) -0.029 -10.140 -0.012 -1.760 -0.034 -13.660 -0.020 -3.090
Output gap (Gap) 0.000 -0.910 0.001 3.220 0.000 0.320 0.002 5.120
Dependency ratio (Popr) 0.019 1.490 0.160 4.900 -0.003 -0.270 0.112 3.830




overall 0.767 0.048 0.983 0.940
Number of observations 421 404 421 40434
Table 7A: Regression results (EMS 1998 Centralization Index)
Wage premium
Dependent variable Fixed effects Country specific trend
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Relative employment level (Remp) -6.345 -8.860 -6.284 -9.970
Centralization Index (Centr) -0.238 -5.790 -0.229 -5.890
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
-3.339 -4.880 -2.830 -5.840
Cross term (Remp*Centr) 0.859 6.050 0.867 6.460
Cross term (Remp*Ypgw) 6.205 4.520 5.993 5.350
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 2.948 8.690 2.424 8.070
Gross government debt (Ggd) 0.049 0.680 -0.021 -0.350
Output gap (Gap) -0.012 -4.200 -0.011 -4.790
Dependency ratio (Popr) -0.559 -2.580 -0.261 -1.430





Number of observations 404 40435
Table 8A: Regression results (OECD Employment Outlook 1997)
Wage premium
Dependent variable Fixed effects Country specific trend
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Relative employment level (Remp) -3.569 -5.440 -3.636 -6.050
Centralization Index (Centr) -0.034 -0.740 -0.020 -0.470
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
-2.483 -3.390 -2.370 -4.330
Cross term (Remp*Centr) 0.220 1.660 0.196 1.550
Cross term (Remp*Ypgw) 3.496 2.410 3.945 3.230
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 2.864 7.880 2.441 7.560
Gross government debt (Ggd) 0.027 0.350 -0.005 -0.080
Output gap (Gap) -0.014 -4.260 -0.013 -4.900
Dependency ratio (Popr) -0.568 -2.360 -0.180 -0.890





Number of observations 384 38436
Table 9A: Regression results (EMS 1998 Only Coordination Index)
Wage premium
Dependent variable Fixed effects Country specific trend
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Relative employment level (Remp) -5.631 -8.580 -5.645 -9.610
Centralization Index (Centr) -0.243 -5.750 -0.240 -5.940
Government current expenditure excluding
employees compensation (Ypgw)
-3.575 -5.210 -3.092 -6.350
Cross term (Remp*Centr) 0.615 5.360 0.625 5.710
Cross term (Remp*Ypgw) 5.616 4.120 5.543 4.960
Government current revenue (Yrgr) 3.200 9.610 2.738 9.210
Gross government debt (Ggd) 0.052 0.730 -0.010 -0.170
Output gap (Gap) -0.014 -4.750 -0.014 -5.600
Dependency ratio (Popr) -0.632 -2.920 -0.368 -2.020





Number of observations 404 404 
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